



Barriers to Border Trade along the Southern Economic Corridor: A Case of Thai-Cambodia Trade on the Border of Srakaew Province

Saran Ratanasithi and Pensri Jaroenwanit

Abstract— This research aims to study barriers hindering trade on the Southern Economic Corridor, specifically border trading activities between Thailand and Cambodia occurring on the border of Srakaew Province. This area was chosen since it has been widely accepted as a major threshold to Cambodia. Applying both qualitative and quantitative research techniques to collect and analyze its data, this research started with compiling qualitative data from various relevant sources prior to operationalizing them via questionnaire survey to clarify and strengthen the former findings. Results show that barriers affecting trade between Thai and Cambodia can be classified into three major groups based on sources of them, i.e. barriers induced by factors internal to Cambodia and related to overseas economic conditions, those influenced by factors internal to the border traders themselves, and barriers caused by factors internal to Thailand. This research concludes that root cause of border trading barriers is failure of both Thai and Cambodia public authorities to facilitate trade flows between the two countries. This situation is unfortunately aggravated by the delicate national relationship together with border traders' preoccupation with factors related to short term financial performance and ignorance of factors related to their long term sustained competitiveness.

Keywords— Barriers, Border Trade, Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), ASEAN, Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), Srakaew Province.

1. INTRODUCTION

Studies relating to border trading activities especially in Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) are supposed to be of particular interest to academia, practitioners, and general public as a whole (see [1] for GMS history, structure, and plan). This is behaviorally logical since cross border trade and investment is a strategic thrust under ten-year GMS strategic framework [2]. In fact, GMS is an important catalysis of concrete economic cooperation and liberalization among the region through implementation of its economic corridors programs.

Possessing a few eminent characteristics with relatively strong potential to facilitate trade, Southern Economic Corridor (SEC) is of particular interest study context. It is a Flagship Program of GMS [1], having 4 sub-corridors, namely Northern, Central, Southern Coastal, and Inter-Corridor Link, which are the most among GMS corridors [2]. SEC links Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It probably is the corridor covering the most geographically, stretching from Thailand, crossing over Cambodia, and destining to three important Vietnamese Southern coastal provinces. Furthermore SEC is the only corridor having inter-

corridor route which provides both an intra- an inter-corridor links, specifically to East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC).

Strategic position of Srakaew province as a border trading hub of the region is very outstanding owing to a few crucial reasons. Being a threshold of both Northern and Central Cambodia because of its geographical advantage, Srakaew province justifies its location on both SEC Northern and Central sub-corridor. This locale advantage enables Srakaew to become the most important pass point between Thai and Cambodia hereby more than half of border trade transaction occurring [3]; while uprising trend can be expected given the facilitative influence of SEC.

For Thailand, border trading transaction has consistently dominated trade with its neighboring countries. Recent statistics still confirms this trend, showing as huge proportion as around 75% on average of border trade to total trade values over the last 5 years with strong growth potential [3], amidst turbulent situation both on Malaysian border in the South and Cambodian one in the East. By [3]'s statistics, Thai-Cambodia border trading is a very important trading mode between the two nations. It is also a promising bilateral trade link since still comprising of negligible proportion of overall Thai trade with its neighbor.

In fact, recent Thai-Cambodia trade narration still reported some critical impediments, e.g. problematic Cambodian laws and regulations [5]. It is quite obvious that these barriers are similar to what were reported in 2004 by [6] and so far have persisted almost a decade. It seems that sustained prosperity of Thai-Cambodia border trade will be initiated only after barriers hindering it are identified and eliminated as long been posited by [4]. There might be hidden critical obstacles impeding trade exercising their influence over others waiting for

Saran Ratanasithi is Ph.D. in Marketing (Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand). An Assistant Professor of Marketing in MBA Program, The Graduate School, Suan Dusit Rajabhat University, Bangkok, Thailand. 145/9 Sukhothai Road, Dusit, Bangkok, 10300. Email: saran_rat@dusit.ac.th.

Pensri Jaroenwanit is Ph.D. in Marketing (Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand). An Associate Professor of Marketing at the Faculty of Management Sciences, Khon Kaen University, Khon Kaen, Thailand. 123 Mitrapharp Road, Muang, Khon Kaen, 40002. Corresponding author, Tel. 081-9743732; Fax 043-202402; E-mail: penjar@kku.ac.th.

uncovered.

Apart from its practical interesting, border trading activity, particularly with regarding to barrier issue, also offers ample academic attraction. Taxonomy of export barrier has still been a weakness in the literature when it has not yet been conclusive [7]. Moreover neither the uniform measurement scale of export barrier has yet been established. As such its inclusive measurement items, dimensions, together with priority have left blurred.

Though fair interest in study of border trade occurs, barrier issue has been an overlooked research domain. Moreover, barrier studies have been dominated by macroeconomic perspective, e.g. [8]. In such analysis, identification, classification, and prioritization of particular barriers are at the best not a major focus. This ignorance occurs even scholars still have been challenged by a major open economy puzzle [9] of experiencing inferior inter-border trade to intra-border trade albeit border liberalization. It seems that myriad of study at the macro level has not done enough to uncover the puzzle.

In Thailand, for example, there is probably only one study focusing on barrier to border trade and it was since 2004 [6]; while in most of the study, barrier issues are basically peripheral to other issues as trading strategies and situation. There were hardly any attempt in classifying and prioritizing the barrier. Moreover these studies' results have been isolated and fragmented.

It seems that we cannot afford to overlook the issue of border trade barrier in a micro-level any longer especially when done in a promising area as Srakaew province. This study thus attempts to answer a general research question of "What are barriers to border trade on the Southern Economic Corridor?" Its endeavor sheds some light on our knowledge of export barrier as recently still called in the literature [7] and particularly to border trade one at least in three aspects of barrier identification, classification, and prioritization. This study therefore offers benefits to both practitioners and academics.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section includes discussion of 5 basic groups of literature respectively, i.e. export barriers, border trade, Thai-Cambodia border trade relationship, barriers to border trade as a whole, and specifically to that between Thai and Cambodia. Details of review are presented as follows.

2.1 Barriers to Export:

To be able to have vivid understanding of obstacles to border trade, it is imperative that we first familiarize with extant export barrier literature.

Interested readers are able to refer to [10], and [11] for thorough review of export barrier literature. In addition, succinct review of conceptualization, taxonomy, and contemporary issues of export barrier can be found in [12].

Taxonomy of export barrier is one inconclusive issue of which [10]'s 4-group proposition of domestic external, domestic internal, overseas external, and

overseas internal, seems to be exhaustive. However, [11] proposed 2-group typology of domestic and overseas, arguing that it might be too complicated and thus not be applicable to small and medium-sized export enterprises (SMEs). While, [13] has also proposed a 2-group taxonomy, i.e. domestic and internal-firm, claimed to be more suitably accommodate exporters from developing countries.

In fact, [12] empirically found that combining of [11]'s and [13]'s into 3-group one might be the most suitable taxonomy for exporting firms from developing countries basically SMEs engaging in border trading activities with their neighboring countries. [12]'s typology divided barriers into 3 groups of those internal to Lao PDR and related to overseas economic conditions or shortly called overseas barriers, barriers internal to Thailand or also called domestic barriers, and those internal to border trader themselves, or so called internal-firm barriers.

This glaring controversy offers a chance for this study to provide another empirical evidence enabling approaching conclusive consensus in the literature.

2.2 Border Trade:

To gain insights in barrier to border trading activities, we also have to be equipped with knowledge of border trading herewith discussed. Readers can refer to [12] for succinct review of border trade literature for its conceptualization, taxonomy, and recent issues of Thailand.

In the last two decades, there are 2 distinct geographical contexts of study in border trade as appeared in scholarly journal, i.e. North America, and Europe Union (EU); while Asia, Latin America, or Africa are chosen by some. This instance is not surprised given the fact that North America is considered having the "Thinnest" border in the world where minimal trade barriers present; while EU has been known to actively promote intra-regional trade [8].

As such, in the developed trading territories, focus has been somewhat even on two crucial issues of border effects and border liberalization. Those studied border effects are basically economic analysis of time series trade data comparing intra-national with inter-national trading transaction of a specific pair of trading countries, e.g. [14], [15], [16].

Border effect is existed if the intra-national trade significantly differs from inter-national one. [14], for example, found such effect when his results showed that Canadian states trade 22 times more among themselves than with U.S. states once income and distance differences are taken into account. His findings is considered by [9] as an open economy puzzle of which its assumption of equal border barriers was tested and rejected by [8]. Yet having macro-level focus, [8] did not provide a list of particular barrier so that measures can be taken to eliminate them. This instance offers an opportunity for this study to add on the literature by generation of such a list.

These studies might well lead to interest in the issue of border liberalization and its consequences on various macroeconomic variables, for instance [17], and [18].

Still there are some studies interested in conditions of liberalization, e.g. trade policy, and copyright enforcement e.g. [19], and [20].

In developing economies, where preoccupation is on enforcing liberalization, narration of trade pattern, e.g. [21] and [22], and development of bilateral or multilateral trade integration, e.g. [23], seem to be of greater interest. Yet, there is another study interested in border effect analyzing its influence on business cycle utilizing Brazilian-Argentinean trade data and found as such, i.e. [24].

2.3 Thai-Cambodia Border Trade Relationship:

This section discusses the following topics, i.e. Cambodia International Trade and Investment Policy, Cambodia Trade Policy toward Thailand, Thai-Cambodia border trade situation and issues.

Cambodia International Trade and Investment Policy:

After collapsing of socialist economy, Cambodia adopted market economy since 1989 [25]; yet during the first decade of this major change, its path to capitalism gradually proceeded owing to difficulties in the country and in the region. Since political stabilization was established in 1999, Cambodia has accelerated its route to open economy development and adopted international free trade and investment policies attractive to the world.

In order to ensure trade and investment counterparts of security to their business, Cambodia also conducts law and regulation reform, especially those related to trade and investment [25]. Classified as one of the poorest nations, Cambodia has received Generalized System of Preference or GSP for its exported products to U.S.A. and E.U. Moreover, it also received Most Favored Nation or MFN status from both U.S.A. and E.U [6].

Cambodia Trade and Investment Policy toward Thailand:

Though regular Thai Cambodia national relationship during Yingluck’s administration has resumed, and even Cambodia conveys the same trade and investment policies with Thailand as it applies to the world, sustained national and so as with trade relationship between them have still been believed to be uncertain.

Intermittently National conflicts between the two nations seem to be unavoidable since a few critical issues, i.e. Phraviharn (Preah Vihear) Temple, and overlapping economic territories in the Gulf of Thailand, have not yet been solved or might not be. The conflicts are very complicated owing to alleged conspiracy among leading politicians of Thai and Cambodia and global mighty powers secretly exploiting rich energy deposits of the two countries.

However, fortunately enough, Phraviharn conflict was limited to the areas where trade is sparse, so it has minimal effect to overall border trade volume between Thai and Cambodia.

Thai-Cambodia Trade Situation:

Currently border trade between Thai and Cambodia occurs through 14 official pass points of which 6 are

permanent points and 8 are temporarily trade facilitating points [26]. These pass points are located along Thai-Cambodia border in 6 provinces from Ubon Ratchathani, Sisaket, Surin, Srakaew, Chantaburi, to Trat. The 2 most important pass points where 90% of trade existed are Klong Luek custom point and Ban Had Lek custom point [26].

a. Trade Proportion:

These following 5 sections present statistical data adapted from those of [3], and [27].

From Table 1, it is obvious that during the last 4 years period, trade between Thailand and its 4 neighboring countries has been dominated by border trade among them when on average border trade value accounts for around 75% of total international trade. Trade between Thailand and Cambodia repeats the same pattern when border trade also accounts for around 75%. Moreover, there is a high potential of increasing trade between Thai and Cambodia since their trade represents only around 7% of trade between Thailand and its other neighboring countries.

Table 1: Proportion of Total Trade Value, Export, Import, and Trade Balance of International Trade and Border Trade between Thailand and Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, and Malaysia (%)

Proportion (%)	2007	2008	2009	2010
	Border Trade between Thailand and its neighboring countries to International Trade between Thailand and its neighboring countries			
Total Trade	70	75	77	77
Export	81	83	87	90
Import	59	66	67	63
Balance	2500	303	685	250
	Border Trade between Thailand and Cambodia to International Trade between Thailand and Cambodia			
Total Trade	78	72	80	68
Export	77	71	80	69
Import	96	98	94	63
Balance	76	70	79	70
	Border Trade between Thailand and Cambodia on the Border of Srakaew Province to Border Trade between Thailand and Cambodia			
Total Trade	51	60	51	56
Export	50	57	50	55
Import	84	92	63	66
Balance	49	55	49	54
	Border Trade between Thailand and Cambodia to Border Trade between Thailand and its neighboring countries			
Total Trade	7	7	7	7
Export	11	12	12	11
Import	1	1	1	2
Balance	40	41	43	24
	International Trade between Thailand and Cambodia to International Trade between Thailand and its neighboring countries			
Total Trade	6	7	7	8
Export	12	14	13	14
Import	1	1	1	2
Balance	1314	180	377	86

Source: Department of Foreign Trade 2011

Table 1 also shows that Srakaew is a very important trading channel between Thai and Cambodia when trading through its border accounts for around 55% on

average during the last four years. These facts all prioritize study of the trade relationship between Thai and Cambodia.

b. Trade Value and Trend:

Table 2 below presents overall Thai-Cambodia border trade value and the trade through Srakaew over the last 4 years and their percentage changes. The trade faced difficulties in 2009, drop of around 10%, partly owing to serious national conflicts between Thai and Cambodia leading to military fighting on the border [28].

Table 2: Border Trade Value of trading between Thailand and Cambodia (Million Baht) and Percentage Change

Value		2007	2008	2009	2010	%Δ 08/07	%Δ 09/08	%Δ 10/09
Border Trade between Thailand and Cambodia	Total Trade	37,479	50,307	45,374	55,411	34.23	-9.81	22.12
	Export	35,425	47,372	42,879	51,113	33.72	-9.48	19.20
	Import	1,613	2,936	2,495	4,298	81.97	-15.01	72.26
	Balance	33,812	44,436	40,384	46,815	31.42	-9.12	15.92
Border Trade between Thailand and Cambodia on the border of Srakaew Province	Total Trade	19,224	29,717	22,980	30,904	54.58	-22.67	34.48
	Export	17,870	27,020	21,396	28,090	51.20	-20.81	31.29
	Import	1,354	2,697	1,584	2,814	99.21	-41.27	77.65
	Balance	16,517	24,323	19,812	25,276	47.27	-18.55	27.58

Source: Department of Foreign Trade 2011, and Bank of Thailand 2011

c. Top-Ten Export of Thailand to Cambodia:

Table 3 shows top-ten list of export from Thailand to Cambodia. Having sugar on the top, with a proportion of around 10% of total export, these products account for almost 50% of total border export of Thailand. This list is very dynamics including 6 new products, i.e. sugar, motor tire, non-alcoholic drink, cosmetics perfume and soap, other vehicles and parts, and other livestock. While interestingly other traditional top ten products disappeared from the list, i.e. garments, cement, animal feeds, petroleum gas and gasoline, agricultural machineries, fertilizer, monosodium glutamate, and sarong (traditional long Thai skirt).

Table 3: Top Ten Export of Thailand to Cambodia in 2010 (Million Baht)

Product	2010
1. Sugar	4,826.5
2. Clothes and Yarn	2,314.2
3. Engine	2,199.3
4. Motor Tyre	2,097.8
5. Automobile, its Parts, and Accessories	1,947.4
6. Motorcycle and its Parts	1,694.1
7. Non-Alcoholic Drink	1,608.0
8. Cosmetics, Perfume, and Soap	1,602.0
9. Other Vehicles and their parts	1,041.4
10. Other Livestocks	1,014.2
Total 10 Export	20,345.0
Other Export	30,762.7
Total Export	51,112.7

Source: Department of Foreign Trade 2011

d. Top-Ten Import of Thailand from Cambodia:

Concentration of import content of Thailand is very high as statistics in Table 4 states that the top ten imports account for around 75% of total import from Cambodia. Moreover, import contents are stable when 7 products of the top-ten list are the same old import products. Three new top-ten imports are other wooden products, other metal ores and scrapped, and bus and truck. Three traditional imports that disappeared from the list are soybean, used garments, and fish and aqua products.

Table 4: Top Ten Import of Thailand from Cambodia in 2010 (Million Baht)

Product	2010
1. Iron	847.2
2. Corn	704.4
3. Aluminium	552.9
4. Tapioca and its related Products	442.9
5. Copper	235.1
6. Scrapped Paper	190.7
7. Garments	30.6
8. Other Wooden Products	22.5
9. Other Metal Ores or Scrapped	12.2
10. Bus and Truck	3.4
Total 10 Import	3,041.8
Other Import	1,256.6
Total Import	4,298.3

Source: Department of Foreign Trade 2011

Issues relating to Thai-Cambodia border trade:

There are at least two important issues relating to border trade between Thai and Cambodia, i.e. national relationship between the two countries and strategic development projects along the Southern Economic Corridors (SEC). For the former issue, interested readers can refer to [28] for chronological review of Thai-Cambodia Phravaharn conflicts during the last three years.

Surprisingly, unlike East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), there are hardly any studies focusing directly on development consequences of SEC. Yet there is an interesting comprehensive development project initiated and operated by Burapha University, titled “Research project for Management and Development of Thai-Cambodia border areas” [29]. This main research project consists of various sub-projects concerning joint development of various pairs of Thai and Cambodia provinces, e.g. a project studying development of facilitation to border trade between Srakaew province and Poi Pet.

2.4 Barriers to Border Trade

Comparing with other research topics relating to border trade, barrier issue is a very thin stream of research of which only 3 are identified and reviewed here after. This should due basically to the fact that major borders, e.g. North America and EU, where a large number of trade occurred, are considered liberalized with minimal or no barrier to trade. Moreover, most of the

relevant studies, e.g. [14], and [15], usually assume an average level of border barriers when conducting at a macro level focusing on examining border effect on trade between each bilateral trade relationship studied. This ignorance makes it impossible to identify, grouping, and prioritizing those particular barriers affecting border trade so that they can be eliminated. The following paragraphs briefly review these border barrier literatures.

Relaxing an equal barrier assumption, [8] found that barriers to border trade are actually very different among each EU national members. Some EU member, e.g. Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark, have imposed no tariff equivalent barriers to trade on some bilateral relationship; while others, e.g. Austria, Italy, and Spain, still maintain as high level of barrier as 75% tariff equivalent on some of theirs.

Realizing void of study focusing on service border trade, [30] examine effect of border trade liberalization policies of both goods and services of Tunisia and Egypt on two main macro economic variables, e.g. economic growth, and standard of living. Arguing for free flowing of skilled service providers and capital, [30] implicitly propose liberalization of capital and skilled labor across border to promote cross border service trades which are very promising trading sector.

[30] found positive effects of policies liberalizing goods trade on both growth and standard of living in Tunisia where its economy is open to global economy. They also found that liberalizing in service trade furthers the improvement of economic development as initiated by goods trade liberalization. However, in Egypt, where its economy has been relatively closed, liberalization effect almost abortive.

Reviewing Tagliacozzo's book titled "Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along the Southeast Asian Frontier 1865-1915", [31] pointed out that Tagliacozzo did not only well narrate smuggling trade in the region but also investigate the relationship between such illegal activities and growth of state power, imposition of colonial rules, and challenges these processes provoked. It can be inferred that smuggling along the border land of Southeast Asia has long been in exist and exercised its mighty influence ever since even on state administration. Therefore, its present is and will be an important barrier to border trade indefinitely since it has a very long and complicated root.

2.5 Barriers to Thai-Cambodia Border Trade

Surprisingly, there are limited numbers of literature relating to barriers to Thai-Cambodia border trade. Moreover, most of them focus on narration of trading situation describing barriers to trade as addition to their major topics. Actually, there is only one study focusing on the topic in 2004 [6]; yet, barriers issues seem to be subordinate to investment feasibility study. Furthermore, if barriers are studied, they are basically identified and described without classified or prioritized.

The following paragraphs present review of relevant literature by adopting [12]'s taxonomy of border trade barriers in grouping the individual barriers as identified by them except for [6] in which her grouping was done.

In their website describing current border trade

situation between Thai and Cambodia in 2011, [5] identifies 13 barriers. There are 7 barriers relating to factors within Cambodia or overseas economic conditions, i.e. uncertainty of trading rules and regulations when they are consistently change or area dependent, complicated and not facilitating import processes as operated by a private company, centralization of authority facilitating trade, unsecured Real currency of Cambodia, high transportation costs owing to poor road condition especially between Aranyaprathet and Banteay Meanchey, Competition from cheaper products from China and Vietnam, and delicate national relationship between Thailand and Cambodia.

There are 4 barriers associating with factors internal to Thailand, i.e. delay in tax refund for export promotion, crowded custom pass point and delay in open new point, no official agency responsible for studying Cambodia market for relevant market information, increase wages deteriorating price competitiveness. While there are 2 barriers linking with factors internal to border traders themselves, i.e. traditional trade practice with no trade document, lack of personnel having knowledge of international trade.

In one of its webpage describing current border trade situation, [32] revealed one barrier considered external to Thailand. It is military fighting between Thai and Cambodia armed forces on the border of Sisaket and Surin provinces early this year leading to close of 2 pass points there. However, fortunately enough this incidence has minimal effect on border trade between the two countries since trade transaction over the border of these two provinces account for negligible value of total border trade between Thai and Cambodia.

In a report narrate border trade situation in 2010, [33] pointed out a similar barrier mentioned above. It is Thai-Cambodia chronic national conflict during the year 2007 to 2010 leading to uncertainty of border trade activities since trader worried about worse conflict causing close of border pass points. This incidence also proves that chronic conflict at least causes anxiety to trader which consequently deterring trading activities.

Studying development approach for border market place, the case of Rong Kluea market, [34] found two important barriers of development relating to Thailand. They are crowded Klong Luek custom pass point, and poor standard of Rong Kluea market.

[35] reported in 2008 that there are 8 barriers impeding border trade between Thailand and Cambodia. Those relating to factors internal to Cambodia comprises of 6 barriers, i.e. poor road condition and other public utilities in Cambodia, uncertainty in rules and regulation of trade owing to their frequent change and area dependence, corruption of Cambodian officers, poor ICT supporting custom operation, competition from cheap products, and Thai and Cambodia national conflict.

There are 2 barriers caused by Thai authorities, which are crowded Klong Luek custom pass point delaying and causing reduce in trade, and the lack of public utilities, electricity, water supply, and telephone connection, at border market of Chong Sa-Ngam, Phusing district of Sisaket province.

In her study of barriers to border trade between Thailand and Cambodia, [6] categorized 5 groups of barriers. These barriers are problematic trading tradition and payment settlement, problems of transportation route and procedure of inbound transportation, problems caused by existence of casino, problems relating to Thai trade rules and regulation and the lack of these rules and regulation of Cambodia, and problems of prevailed cross border criminal transaction.

Yet, it is quite clear that [6] did not apply her conceptual classification criteria in grouping trade barriers since for instance she grouped the problematic rules and regulation of Thailand with those of Cambodia. Moreover, [6] ignored outlining those barriers internal to border traders themselves even though she cited a few of such barriers in her first barrier group. She did not explicitly prioritize these barriers either.

3. METHODOLOGY

Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were applied in this research. Operation commenced by compiling qualitative data from various sources and activities prior to operationalizing the qualitative findings. Its qualitative endeavors included archival data investigation, in-depth interview and focus group discussion. In-depth interview was done with 24 informants comprising of scholar who are border trade researchers and experts of the field who are experienced or successful border traders and government officers in charge of border trading activities. Focus group was conducted with 10 active border traders from various trading sectors. Content analysis was conducted to classify and prioritize barriers to border trade.

Then quantitative field survey research method was conducted by using questionnaire as a data collection tool. Each barrier variable was measured on a six-point Likert scale. The sampling frame for this study is a trader directory of Klong Luek custom office consisting of 110 firms. The targeted respondents are in managerial position either owners or decision makers who directly involve in their company's Thai-Cambodia border trading. Firstly purposive sampling method was used by specifically focusing on those firms trading on a regular basis.

There were 65 firms within the sampling frame approached by telephone soliciting responses from each of them before the questionnaires were faxed or email to target respondents. A total of 32 firms consented to supply the necessary information and returned the questionnaires. Descriptive statistical analysis method was employed for analyzing the surveyed data to validate and confirm qualitative results of this research.

4. RESULTS

This research finds that there are 77 particular barriers to Thai-Cambodia border trade. These barriers were prioritized by their sample mean scores of which the top ten scores are shown in Table 5 below.

By their overall score of 5.11, these barriers are considered very important by border trade. There are 4

barriers thought to be the most important which are repeated taxing or not transparent taxing procedure of Cambodia; higher cost from hiking gasoline cost; not international, unclear, and not facilitating trade of law system, trade regulations, and justice process of Cambodia; and problematic law enforcement in Cambodia which is unclear, lack of standard, area dependent, or enforcer dependent.

Table 5: Top Ten Border Trade Barriers

Barrier	Mean	S.D.	Level of Importance
1. Repeated taxing or not transparent taxing procedure of Cambodia	5.47	1.08	Most important
2. Higher cost from hiking gasoline cost	5.22	1.04	Most important
3. Problematic law system, trade regulations, and justice process of Cambodia, i.e. out of date, not international, unclear, and not facilitating trade	5.19	1.04	Most important
4. Problematic law enforcement in Cambodia which is unclear, lack of standard, area dependent, or enforcer dependent	5.19	1.23	Most important
5. Thai products are copied by cheaper China and Vietnamese products	5.10	0.89	Very Important
6. Uncertainty of investment promotion policy and other relating laws and regulations	5.06	1.19	Very Important
7. Delay of Cambodian authorities in communicating with Cambodian consumer for resuming confidence in problematic Thai products and lifting the banning notice	5.00	1.22	Very Important
8. Competition from low quality and very cheap products from China and Vietnam targeting very poor rural Cambodian people	5.00	1.17	Very Important
9. Corruption of Cambodian government officers	4.94	1.48	Very Important
10. Poor transportation route	4.94	1.29	Very Important
Total	5.11	1.16	Very Important

Note: 1.00 – 1.83 is Not at all important
 1.84 – 2.67 is Not quite important
 2.68 – 3.50 is Quite important
 3.51 – 4.33 is Important
 4.34 – 5.17 is Very important
 5.18 – 6.00 is Most important

The rest on the top ten list are evaluated as very important which are uncertainty of investment promotion policy and other relating laws and regulations; delay of Cambodian authorities in communicating with Cambodian consumer for resuming confidence in problematic Thai products and lifting the banning notice; competition from low quality and very cheap products from China and Vietnam targeting very poor rural Cambodian people; corruption of Cambodian government officers; and poor transportation route.

Based on [12]'s criteria, these 77 individual barriers were classified into three groups of barrier according to their causes, i.e. barriers relating to factors internal to Cambodia and overseas economic conditions, or overseas barriers, as shown in Table 6, those relating to factors internal to border traders themselves, or internal firm barriers, as shown in Table 7, and barriers relating to factors internal to Thailand, or domestic barriers, as shown in Table 8. Content validation for these barrier components were conducted by 5 experts and support for [12]'s taxonomy was established. The following paragraphs will elaborate on each group of border trade barrier.

Barrier related to Cambodia and overseas economic conditions:

As shown in Table 6 below, the first group of border trade barrier consists of 7 subgroups of barrier related to Cambodia and overseas economic conditions or barriers caused by factors external to Thailand. These barriers all together are considered important by border trader and are the most critical according to majority of respondents.

Barrier	Mean	S.D.	Level of Importance
1. Out of date law and regulations and uncertainty in their enforcement together with Unclear policy not facilitating trade of Cambodia	5.23	1.21	Most important
2. Competition from international traders especially China and Vietnam and foreign exchange risk	4.52	1.23	Very important
3. Poor public services, corruption of government officers, and political instability of Cambodia	4.26	1.47	Important
4. Misbehavior of Cambodian traders or inappropriate tradition of trade and poor standard Cambodian products	4.15	1.41	Important
5. Poor public infrastructures and trade facilities of Cambodia	4.13	1.68	Important
6. Delicate national relationship with Cambodia	3.99	1.70	Important
7. Low living standard and limited exposure to relevant information of the Cambodian	3.74	1.74	Important
Total	4.29	1.49	Important

There is one subgroup of barrier rated as the most important, i.e. out of date law and regulations and uncertainty in their enforcement together with unclear policy not facilitating trade of Cambodia. This subgroup comprises of 4 particular barriers and they are ranked first, third, fourth, an sixth in the top ten list.

The other subgroup of barrier is evaluated as very important which is competition from international traders especially from China and Vietnam and exposure to foreign exchange risk. It has 3 individual barriers of which two are ranked fifth and eighth in the top ten; while the other one, rated as not quite important, is risk from highly volatile U.S. dollars, a popular payment medium.

The rest 5 subgroups of barrier are considered important and are described as following.

Poor public services, corruption of government officers, and political instability in Cambodia has 4 barrier items of which two are ranked seventh and ninth in the top ten. The rest two barriers are the obscured national unity and hence suspicious national security in Cambodian since there are still independent armed forces left operating on the Thai border, rated as quite important; and complicated and red tape in import processes together with uncertain and short office hours of Cambodian pass points owing to two hours lunch break tradition, rated as not quite important.

Misbehavior of Cambodian traders or inappropriate tradition of trade and poor standard Cambodian products is comprised of 3 barriers, i.e. lack of responsibility in payment of credit trade account of Cambodian trader, rated as very important; poor hygienic standard of Cambodian aqua products; and plant diseases and insects

from Cambodian farm crops, both are rated as quite important.

Poor public infrastructures and trade facilities of Cambodia consists of 5 individual barriers of which one is ranked tenth in the top ten list. The others is also rated as very important, i.e. unready of Cambodian trucking transportation, e.g. truck operating without insurance. The other two barriers are quite important which are unready trucking with special equipment, e.g. air conditioner; and unready of communication facilities. The last one is rated as not quite important, i.e. unprepared supporting service industries, e.g. hotel and restaurant.

Delicate national relationship with Cambodia has 2 particular barriers rated as quite important. These are firstly the Cambodian and their government hold negative attitude toward Thailand and hence are suspicious of Thailand in mistreating and taking advantages of them from border trading. Secondly, Phraviharn temple conflict as linked with notorious alleged conspiracy between Cambodian leaders and former Thai political leader in exploitation of controversial energy resource endowment in the gulf of Thailand for their own benefits.

Low living standard and limited exposure to relevant information of the Cambodian consists of 2 barrier variables. The first one is poverty and the lack of information of majority of the Cambodian living in isolated rural area which is rated as quite important. The second one is the lack of identification documents of both individual and business concern in Cambodia, rated as not quite important though.

Barriers caused by factors internal to border traders themselves:

In Table 7 underneath, the second group of border trade barriers caused by factors internal to border traders themselves is presented. This group of barrier is also considered important but is thought of as less critical than the first group by majority of informants. There are three subgroups of border trade barrier in this group. Moreover, each subgroup is also rated as important as narrated hereafter.

Barrier	Mean	S.D.	Level of Importance
1. Not professional trading practices of Thai border trader	4.06	1.55	Important
2. Disadvantages from trading with trade documents of Thai border trader	3.81	1.66	Important
3. Misbehavior or risky tradition in trading of Thai border trader	3.79	1.59	Important
Total	3.89	1.60	Important

Not professional trading practice of Thai border trader consists of 3 individual barriers. The first one is considered very important, which is the lack of unity and cooperation among traders, focusing principally on personal benefits. The rest two barriers are rated as quite important. The former is lack of vision in business administration, preoccupying with short term ad hoc benefits. The latter is the lack of enthusiastic business

action, e.g. procrastinating of market visit, and ignoring product development attempt arguing responsibility of product owners.

Disadvantages from trading with trade documents of Thai border trader is the only single item barrier component rated as quite important.

Misbehavior or risky tradition in trading of Thai border trader has 8 barriers. One barrier is rated as very important, i.e. risk of careless practices in conducting credit trade, e.g. over limit accounts, credit sales without documents, leading to abundant overdue account receivable and bad debt in the end. There are 4 more interesting barriers cited as examples. Firstly the lack of working capital to finance credit sale, and difficulties in managing credit accounts, rated as quite important. Unethical trading practices, e.g. selling of expired foods or beverages to the Cambodian traders, and no prior notice of price changes, rated as quite important. Inefficient and timely processing of small orders, also rated as quite important. Lastly unethical filing for tax refund from Thai government, rated as not quite important.

Barriers related to factor internal to Thailand:

Table 8 below presents the third group of border trade barriers related to factors internal to Thailand or they are generated in Thailand either by governmental or private concerns apart from by border traders themselves. Like the two former groups, this group of barrier is also considered important; yet is the least critical according to most informants' view. There are 9 subgroups of border trade barrier in this group which are describing as follow.

Barrier	Mean	S.D.	Level of Importance
1. Higher cost of trade in Thailand	4.48	1.31	Very important
2. No strategic plan for border trading of Thailand	4.17	1.58	Important
3. Illegal trading and Thai gambler crossing to casinos	4.15	1.59	Important
4. Losing intermediary status and lack of support from relevant private concerns of Thailand	4.12	1.48	Important
5. Out of date laws and regulations relevant to trade of Thailand	3.80	1.63	Important
6. Corruption of Thai government officers	3.68	1.59	Important
7. Inefficient and uncooperative public services of Thailand	3.62	1.71	Important
8. Poor trade infrastructures of Thailand	3.28	1.81	Quite important
9. Low competitiveness of Thai traders caused by national handicaps	2.90	1.66	Quite important
Total	3.80	1.60	Important

There is a subgroup of barrier considered very important, i.e. higher cost of trade in Thailand. This cost rise is caused basically by increases of three costs of trading. The first is oil price hike, rated as the most important and is the second in the top-ten list. Secondly wages surge is considered very important. Lastly interest rise is rated as quite important.

The latter 6 subgroups are rated each as important and narrated as follow.

The first is no strategic plan for border trading of Thailand is comprised of 3 particular barriers. The first of which rated as very important is the lack of national

blueprint to deal with exploitation of abound deserted land occupied by various influential entities, from public, private, and military concerns, especially in Srakaew province. The second is a lack of provincial development master plan which specified clear development vision and directions, rated as quite important. The last is the lack of provincial plan for border trade development, also rated as quite important.

Secondly, illegal trading and Thai gamblers crossing to casinos consists of two barriers. The first one is smuggling, especially drugs, labor, and auto vehicles, rated as very important since their trades cause stringent control on the border of Thai armed forces to inhibit such mal-trades. The second is stream of gamblers crossing to Cambodian casino causing jam in immigration toll, rated as quite important.

The third subgroup is losing intermediary status and lack of support from relevant private concerns of Thailand has 4 specific barriers. There is a barrier considered as very important which is direct selling to Cambodian market by products owners or major distributors. Three other barriers are rated as quite important. The first is the lack of monopoly power from being single authorized dealer in Cambodian market. The second is trade obstruction by some trade or industry association or regional influential interest group. The last one is the lack of motivation to work actively for chamber of commerce or industry association since there is a conflict of interest, personally versus collectively.

Fourthly, out of date laws and regulations relevant to trade of Thailand consists of 4 barriers. The first one is rated as very important, i.e. the lack of trade documents and international debt enforcement process. The second barrier is complicated trade rules and regulations increasing transaction costs or limiting trading volume, rated as quite important. The third one is out of date and not facilitating provincial regulations, rated as quite important.. The final one is out of date, conflicting, or inflexible law relevant to trade of Thailand, rated as not quite important.

Fifthly, corruption of Thai government officers has 3 specific barriers. The first one is forced bribery by Thai police officers controlling the routes to border from transported trucks, rated as quite important. The second barrier is no transparency in visa application procedure at the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh deterring traders' application, rated as quite important. The last one is forced bribery by various relevant Thai government agencies investigating products at border passing points, rated as not quite important.

The sixth barrier is inefficient and uncooperative public services of Thailand. It is the largest subgroup comprised of 14 particular barriers of which some interesting one are mentioned hereby. There is one barrier considered very important, i.e. there is no Thai consular office in Poi Pet to facilitate border crossing processes, e.g. visa issuing and extending, especially to the Cambodian residing in the Western provinces wishing to visit Thailand for business or touring, or international tourists wishing to revalidate their visa without voyage a long way to Phnom Penh.

There are four barriers rated as quite important which

are no provincial border committee in charge of border issues from security to trade and investment, crowded custom pass points and immigration check points especially Klong Luek, difficulties in opening new pass points caused by security issues, and inefficient or practically failure of one stop service facilities. Yet there are three interesting barriers rated as not quite important which are the lack of cooperation in facilitating border trade transaction both among Thai agencies and between Thai and Cambodia agencies; and delay in and inconsistent of national negotiation on border issues and consequently uncertainty in the border line.

The last two subgroups of barrier are evaluated as quite important.

The first one is poor trade infrastructures of Thailand consisting of 7 specific barriers, surprisingly all rated as not quite important, of which 4 interesting ones are narrated hereby. The first one is delay in construction of Srakaew trade distribution center caused by controversy over location choice. The second barrier is ignorance in improvement and development of rail road transportation especially double rails transportation. The third one is no branch of Thai commercial banks operating in areas adjacent to border such as Poi Pet to facilitate payment. The last barrier is the lack of supporting service industries in Srakaew especially in Aranyaprathet, e.g. good quality hotel and restaurant.

The second barrier is low competitiveness of Thai traders owing to national handicaps comprised of 2 individual barriers, also surprisingly rated as not quite important. The first barrier is poor labor owing to low productivity and short of product development skill leading to inability to compete with cheap products from China and Vietnam. The second one is difficulties in accessing cheap funding from bank or other financial institution owing to short of hard collaterals by operating on public land and getting only temporary renewable rent contract without granting official ownership and certificate.

5. DISCUSSION

The discussion is comprised of three basic parts which are making sense of 3-group typology and comparing it with extant literature, addressing weaknesses in the export barrier and border trade literature as identified and strengthening by this research, justifying the top-ten list of barriers and comparing them with extant literature in Thailand.

Validating three major components of barrier to border trade, this study provides empirical support for 3-group typology of barrier to border trade as found by [12]. This typology is supposedly the most suitable for exporter from developing economies, basically SMEs, conducting cross border trading with its neighboring countries. It is not as complicated as [10]'s 4-group taxonomy applicable to exporters from developed countries conducting international trading activities. At the same time, neither it as rough as [13]'s 2-group one, appropriate with exporters from developing countries conducting international trade.

The 3-group taxonomy of barrier to border trade, i.e.

overseas, domestic, and internal-firm barriers, is sufficiently logical. The first two groups are external to the trading firms which mean they do not have control. Overseas barriers are those caused by factors internal to Cambodia or overseas economic conditions which Thailand does not have direct control. Domestic barriers are those caused by factors internal to Thailand which it is supposed to have direct fully control. Internal-firm barriers are those caused by factors internal to the firm which it is supposed to have direct fully control.

This taxonomy is resemblance that of [11] since both studies conducted with SME contexts as a consequence the two taxonomies having domestic and overseas barriers in common. However, idiosyncrasies of border trading, study context of this study, making internal-firm barriers so eminent that they cannot be left blended with the domestic ones and that they are split out.

Such idiosyncrasies for example the inferior competitive position caused by documentary trading which is very unique of border trading activities conducted between developing nations. Yet, further subdivision of internal-firm barriers to those occurring domestically and overseas is not appropriate since borderland though separated by national sovereignty, behaviorally is united in term of business patterns and people's walk of life. This means that the borderland is supposedly an economically sovereignty state where in considering economic activities conducting on it national sovereignty seems to be not applicable.

This taxonomy is also resemblance that of [13] since both are found by studying the developing economy contexts as a consequence the two taxonomies having domestic and internal-firm barriers in common. However, idiosyncrasies of border trading again cause division of those barriers occurring outside of the firm into domestic and overseas ones since the Thai government has been seen evidently that it has at the best limited or temporary ability to take control over any delicate issues related to national relationship, e.g. national boundary issue. This is consistent with what [30] argue that, in developing countries context, these are barriers related to factors far deep and complicated beyond those at the border.

Such idiosyncrasies for example alleged conspiracy between Cambodian leaders and former Thai political leaders in making personal benefits out of both national resource deposits an incidence which widely believed that has dominated every aspect of national relationship between the two nations. Such incidence is even much more complicated when it has been alleged that there are secret intervention from various global mighty powers to exploit one of the world richest energy deposit. The conspiracy issue is an obvious difference between results of this study and [12]'s since Thai-Lao relationship has been very smooth for decades.

This study has done its best to partly move export barrier body of knowledge toward conclusion of the taxonomy issue as recently called by [7]. One of the possible conclusion if it might be put forward is that [10]'s 4-group taxonomy is applicable to exporters from developed countries conducting international trading activities. [13]'s one is appropriate with exporters from

developing countries conducting international trade. Whereas [12]'s as empirically supported by this study is suitable for idiosyncrasies of border trading along national border of developing countries.

Moreover, this study has attempted to take part in an endeavor to propose a uniform measure scale done by [7]. By compiling a pool of 77 barriers variables, it endeavored to create exhaustive domain of measurement items which is the first step for development of a better marketing scale as postulated by [36]. Conducting validation and prioritization of barrier components in a preliminary fashion, this study provides a foundation for further operationalization its results; thus also partly helps pushing standard scale construction possible.

Furthermore, it has at its hardest attempt to more or less explicate the open economy puzzle raised by [9]. Chronic stagnant in unfolding the puzzle should due mainly to preoccupation with econometric modeling utilizing macro data analysis explaining overall economic phenomena ignoring undertow of influential decision at the micro level by each business unit. Border effect existence amidst trade liberalization over the border and hardly any psychic distance between the trading nations leading to inferior international trade phenomena is not surprising since those econometric models have not been able to capture exhaustively micro-level factors influencing border trader's decision.

Had such complicated yet not exhaustive model been able to capture such micro-level factors, they would have found that the costs of inter-border trade have still been immense, no matter whether measured in tariff equivalent quantitative term [8] or others. As a consequence, it would not have been puzzled at least for a decade why do inter-border trade is subordinate to intra-border trade in such thinnest border as North America or EU.

This research effort thus more or less helpful in explicate such a myth amidst global integrated economy. A humble answer to [9]'s puzzle is that there are much less inter-border trade than expected along the thinnest borders because what we usually see obstructing trade over there is just a tip of the iceberg of which its huge foundation is undertow ignoring for so long. Therefore what was done by this research is disclosing the underwater part of the iceberg which is identifying possibly exhaustive barrier variables, categorizing, and prioritizing them so that we recognize the genuine hindrance to inter-border trade. And only after this recognition that we are able to figure out how to eliminate them [4].

Taxonomy of Thai-Cambodia border barrier found in this study probably captures every single barrier so far identified by studies conducting in Thailand. Yet, there have been hardly any attempts in classifying these barriers so that comparison can be made. Though not explicitly articulated, one such attempt was done by [6] to which comparison can only be made. [6]'s 5-group typology discussed fairly enough and touched upon almost equally barriers internal to Thailand and Cambodia. She however mentioned just a few of barriers internal to Thai border trader, i.e. non-documentary trading practices of Thai border trader, and their

unethical trading practices, more importantly ignoring outlining it.

Barriers identified by this study were also cited in the relevant studies in somewhat corresponding order of importance. In its top-ten list of barriers, 9 of them are those relating to factors internal to Cambodia and overseas economic conditions. In fact, these barriers have also been focused by majority of study conducting in the Thailand [5], [6], [32], [33], [34], and [35]. It is understandable why border traders considerably more worry about uncontrollable factors external to Thailand than those internal to their countries. Coping with these obstacles, border traders have to rely on indirect influence exercising through Thai government on which they take direct control neither.

There are 6 barriers of the top-ten list caused by Cambodian public administration, e.g. poor taxation, problematic laws and their enforcement also emphasized by [5], [6], and [35], poor infrastructure, especial road conditions, also stressed by [5], [6], and [35], and corruption of Cambodian officers also highlighted by [35]. These findings are not surprising since weaknesses of public sector seem to be prevailed in developing countries where governmental agencies usually develop much more slowly than those private concerns.

There are 2 obstacles of the list induced by competition from the world factory, China, and its follower, Vietnam also stressed by [5], and [35]. Their competitive advantages were understandably derived from price sensitiveness of the poor Cambodian. This issue is very worrying since it is apparent that border traders are preoccupied with blaming the factor price hikes, oil and wages, causing their disadvantages. They mistakenly overlook at least two serious national handicaps depreciating their sustained competitiveness as identified by this study, i.e. poor labor productivity, and inconvenient access to sources of fund.

There is a barrier relating to Thai-Cambodia relationship on the top-ten list, i.e. delay in rescuing image of problematic Thai products by Cambodian authorities. Though finding it is important, Phraviharn issue was considered relatively less critical by this study. This is due mainly to the fact that the specific conflicting area, Phraviharn temple in Sisaket province, is reasonably far from Srakaew so the eruption of Thai-Cambodia war on its border had limited effects on trade transaction on Srakaew border as also mentioned in [32], and [33]. Moreover Thai border trader suspicion in its correlation with international conspiracy might confound their judgments and lessen its critical.

In other studies however, Phraviharn conflict seem to be very critical barrier in the sense that it has been frequently cited recently, e.g. [5], [6], [32], [33], and [35], and causing uncertainty and anxiety. However, in term of direct loss on trading value, its effects have still been minimal [32].

The Thai-Cambodia national relationship issue is worrying in the sense that its sustained solution seems to be next to impossible and going toward it seems to take indefinitely time frame. This is due basically to alleged conspiracy theory and intervention from third party mighty power nations. These incidences confer a very

crucial policy implication in the sense that foreign ministry of Thailand has to take a very active role in dealing with these serious inconveniences, if we would like to nourish Thai-Cambodia border trade.

There is only one barrier internal to Thailand in the top-ten list which is higher cost of trade owing to oil price hike sharply. The rise occurred not long after privatization of national petroleum company (PTT) alleged to be acquired by nominees of former political leader. Profit incentive inspired PTT to exercising its market leader position in continuously raising oil price by claiming world oil situation as its scapegoat. [5] also mentioned about the issue of higher cost of trade but in their case causing by higher wages.

Those barriers internal to Thailand were mentioned by some relevant studies. Basically focuses were on inefficient services, specifically jam, of custom pass point, especially Klong Luek pass point, causing delay in trade [5], [6], [34], and [35]. This study provides only partial support to the issue since it found that border trader did not consider it that important. It is seemingly because most of border trader trading through Srakaew border are experienced one knowing how to manage routinely to get through the jam. It is quite surprised that smuggling is forgotten at least recently though it was found important by this study and used to be highlighted by [6] and [31] as deep rooted over the border.

There is no barrier caused by border trader themselves at all in the top-ten list of this study. This is not beyond expectation since it is believed that a human being naturally will blame others as causing him difficulties prior to blaming himself. Moreover, people also usually look at others' mistakes as much more serious than theirs. In Thailand there are a few proverbs witnessing such belief, i.e. "A poor performance dancer usually blames the orchestra for turning him down", and "Other people's mistakes are as thick as a mountain but ours are as thin as a hair". [6] discussed the issues of careless and unethical trade practices of Thai border trader fairly enough by putting them modestly under her payment issue also mixing them with the Cambodian's malpractice.

6. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

This study concludes that border traders exhibit their concerns basically over short term factors having direct impacts on their day to day trading activities; e.g. rising costs, competitions by counterfeits and unfavorably practices of Cambodian authorities ranging from repeating tariff charging, poor bad debt suing, multi-standard practices, to corruption. They at the same time somewhat ignore those long term oriented factors affecting their sustained competitiveness, such as labor productivity, logistical infrastructures, their ethical trading practices, and even sustained harmonious national relationship.

Moreover, it also concludes that major sources of border trading barriers are failure of both Thai and Cambodia public administration to facilitate trade flows between the two countries since national relationship and cooperation have been suffered from influential

intervention.

Following [13]'s conclusion, this study's rationale for proposing recommendation is more strategically long-term oriented focusing on attacking barriers at their root causes and how controllable the issues are based on border trader perspective not as much on urgency of the issue. It believes that this approach will lead to sustained development in border trading.

As such this section starts with what border traders themselves might consider improve. Recognizing their misbehaviors and alleged unethical practices both against their countries in term of taxation and against their Cambodian counterparts, Thai border traders firstly might have to prioritize these issues and determine to adjust their business practices. This is certainly much easier said than done since the obedient and sacrifice ones will be suffer deeply when their price competitiveness is ruining by rising cost incurring by these good deeds.

In fact, inducing a very constructive collective action benefiting a society as a whole is a major responsibility of the government. However, amidst chronic political commotion in Thailand leading to political instability, the solution then seems to be every trader's self initiation to commence such collective change simultaneously. This mission certainly requires unity among trader. Therefore, an ad hoc measure to facilitate gradually build up of unity must be figure out.

One possible way is adopting new perspective in doing business for sustainability based on the King's philosophy of sufficiency economics and moral sentiment concept as referred and explained in [37]. It is creation of a very important innovation but it is mentally not materially and can be started suddenly by every trader provided that they sincerely believe in the King's philosophy. The other is having a visionary and charismatic regional leader who will be able to facilitate their unity.

Thai government might consider focusing its effort on building up and improving of border trader's sustained competitiveness as follow. Firstly, it will have to provide a typical national role model of operating ethically. Ethical practices might have to be a national agenda.

Government might have to generate a blueprint of strategic development of border trade to outlay direction, time frame, and concerned agencies. It will have to make strategic attempt at its best to reduce costs of trader's business operation by focusing on three critical issues which are poor labor productivity, inconvenient access to source of fund, and poor logistics infrastructures.

For productivity barrier, the Three-High approach, i.e. high income, reasonably high price, leading to high productivity, if agreed by the government and actively implemented on a national level might well be very helpful for this specific economic context also.

Improvement and construction of standard logistics system, e.g. improvement of road coverage and conditions, building double-rail transport platform, construction of goods distribution center, seem to require regional unity among influential entities or figures again once personal sacrifice might have to be delivered for collective progress.

Government of Thailand might consider lubricating border trade flow by restructuring of laws and regulation systems affecting trade both on the national and provincial level. Research might be required for investigation of those relevant laws and regulation impeding trade so that targeting and effective correction of them can be done.

Government might also have to consider improve implementation of creative service arrangement, e.g. one-stop export service, and paperless and single-window custom service, so that it is done efficiently and effectively.

Corruption can be effectively eliminated, once government officers are reasonably well compensated for their duties and responsibilities as reinforcing by trader's determination on ethical business practice by quitting bribery.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand has to take a very constructive and active role in dealing with various serious inconveniences caused by the Cambodian sides, if we would like to nourish Thai-Cambodia border trade. It seems that harmonious national relationship between the two nations is the threshold to remedy every barrier internal to Cambodia. One helpful project possibly implemented by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is an opening of a consular office at Poi Pet to facilitate cross border transaction of those Cambodians residing in the West and international tourists.

Interested scholars might consider conducting these following topics in the future. They might consider investigating laws and regulation system relevant to international trade, especially border trade so that successful amendment can be made.

These academia might extend from this qualitative enquiry by conducting main quantitative empirical study to clarify confirm and generalize the findings of this study is strongly encouraged. They can also study dependent relationship between border barriers and their strategic and performance consequences are also very interested research issues.

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